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Murder in the United States today is defined by statute.' Most of the stat-
ues now divide murder into two degrees, but a few have created three degrees.
In two of the states which have three degrees of murder there is no provision
for capital pumshment.- In Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mis-
sissippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota and Texas there are no degrees
of murder.
From a standpoint of construction the murder statutes as to intentional mur-
der may be divided into three types:
1. Those which define murder generally and also by degrees, and which
deviate from the common law only by the additional requisite of de-
liberation and premeditation, or premeditation alone, for a first degree
conviction.
2. Those which define murder generally, utilizing only a bare common law
definition of the crime.
.3. Those which attempt to depart from the common law entirely and set up
a new definition.
Typical of the statutes of the first group is that of California which describes
ntentionalmurder as follows:'
"187. Murder defined. Murder is the unlawful killing of
it human being, with malice aforethought.
"188. Malice defined: [Express and Implied]. Such mal-
ice may be express or implied. It is express when there is manifested
a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow
creature. It is implied, when no considerable provocation ap-
pears.
"189. [Degrees of murder]. All murder which is per-
petrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by any other
land of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing is murder
of the first degree and all other kinds of murders are of the second
degree."
The statute of Georgia, illustrative of the second group, creates no degrees
of murder and represents a mere general common law definition of the crime. The
Georgia statute reads as follows:'
"60. Murder. Murder is the unlawful killing of a human
being, in the peace of the State, by a person of sound memory and
discretion, with malice aforethought, either express or implied."
* The note by Mr. Cagle on page 424 is a companion note to this one.
'The first state to create statutory degrees of murder was Pennsylvania in 1794.
See N. Y L.,,w. RFv. Cos itissioN REPORT 543 (1937).
Kentucky is the only state which does not have a statute generally defining
imurder. See Lucas v. Com., 231 Ky. 76, 78, 21 S. IV. 2d 113, 114 (1929); Com. v.
Illinois C. R. R., 152 Ky. 320, 324, 153 S. W 459, 461 (1913). In South Carolina
although murder is defined by statute it is not made a statutory. offense. See State
v. Bowvers, 65 S. C. 207, 213, 43 S. E. 656, 658 (1903).
-2 MINN. STAT. sec. 619.07 (1945); Wisc. STAT. sec. 340.02 (1943).
CA1,: i PENAL CODE, tit. 8, secs. 187, 188, 189 (Deering, 1941).
16 G%. CODF ANN. sec. 60 (Parks, 1914).
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The New York statute representative of the third group of statutes defines the
intentional murder as:'
"1044. Murder in the first degree defined. The killing
of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifiable, is murder in
the first degree when committed:
"(1) from a deliberate and premeditated design to effect
the death of the person killed or of another, or
"1046. Murder in the second degree defined. Such
killing of a human being is murder m the second degree, when com-
mitted with a design to effect the death of the person killed, or of
another, but without deliberation and premeditation."
The intentional murder under the statutes is either first or second degree.
Intentional first degree murder, pumshable by death or long impnsonment, is
murder which is marked by deliberation and premeditation. ' Nearly all of the
statutes expressly require deliberation and premeditation, or premeditation alone,
but the meamng of these words and the manner in which they may be deter-
mined are questions upon which there is considerable diversity.
Deliberation and Premeditation
At common law certain acts of killing were set out for special condemnation.
Among such acts, one was a killing by lying in wait. After the Norman Conquest,
the English, seeking vengeance, killed Norman travelers and as a result the Norman
kings imposed the fine of murdrum upon the district in which such killings oc-
curred." The fine of murdum was abolished, but the phrase lying in wait re-
mained in the law. A kiing by poisomng also was shortly thereafter declared to
be murder.6 Petit treason, the killing of a husband by the wife, or the killing of
a master by a servant, became an aggravated murder.6 The depravity of the act
was no doubt the basis upon which pumshment was meted out at the common law.
A killing by poisomng or while lying in wait normally suggests a preconceived
and well prepared plan and this may have been the reason the statutes adopted
such phraseology; or, perhaps, the legislators merely intended to incorporate the
common law into the statutes. The first degree statutes of twenty-five states,
which are Califorma type statutes, incorporate the phrase, "All murder wluch
shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait "or a phrase sub-
N. Y. CONSOL. LAWS, Pt. 1, Art. 94, secs. 1044, 1046 (Thompson, 1939).
Mergner v. United States, 147 F 2d 572 (App. D. C. 1945); Bradshaw v. Com.,
174 Va. 391, 4 S. E. 2d 752 (1939).
- STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIuMINAL LAW 136-137 (2d ed. 1890).
8 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENIrARIIS 196.
9STrEPHEN, op. cit. supra, note 8, at 140. The early statutes in this country made
petit treason a special kind of murder. Toda petit treason as a distinct type of
murder in many states has been abolished by statute. Representative or such
statutes is N. Y. CONSOL. LAW, Pt. 1, Art. 94, sec. 1040 (Thompson, 1939).
Today by statute in some states it is made first degree murder to assist in a
suicide. See 4 ARK. STAT. ANN. sec. 41-2211 (1947).
In other states to cause the death of another in a duel is by statute made first
or second degree murder. See 5 NEV. Co~in. LAws sec. 10104 (Hillyer, 1929):
8 ORE Co'mP. LAWS sec. 23-404 (1940); R. I. GEN. LAWS, c. 606, sec. 9 (1938).
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stantiallv the same." Other statutes list poison and omit lying in wait.' In Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, New Hampshire, Nevada,
North Carolina, and North Dakota, torture is specifically condemned."
2 The stat-
ute of Massachusetts uses the phrase with extreme atrocity or cruelty.' New
lHam pshire, North Carolina, and 'West Virginia include death by starving" The
Nebraska statute punishes for first degree murder, whoever by wilful and
corrupt perjury or subornation of the same, shall purposely procure the conviction
and execution of any innocent person "' Virgima, West Virginia and North
Carolina provide for the first degree conviction of one who causes the death of
another by imprisoning the latter." If the killing is proved to have -been com-
mitted in one of the manners specifically condemned this conclusively establishes
deliberation and premeditation."
A killing as the result of poison, lying in wait, torture, by perjury or subor-
nation of perjury, or with extreme atrocity and cruelty, indicates that the killing
was probably not an impulsive act. Each act requires some preparation, and at
least a sufficient time for a rational mental process. However, it is questionable
whether a modern statute on intentional first degree murder should set aside spe-
cific acts which if proven are conclusive of the existence of deliberation and pre-
meditation. It is arguable that if specific acts are categorized that might more
readily deter potential offenders by impressing upon such persons that certain
designated acts will be first degree murder. But the fine legal technicalities
attached to the manner in which an intentional killing may be accomplished are
not of general knowledge. Any rational person knows that it is morally and
legally wrong to kill a hunian being by poison, or while lying in wait, or by any
other intentional means. A statute which categorically states that a murder per-
petrated by poison, lving in wait, or torture shall be first degree murder should
mean no more than that a homicide which is perpetrated by poison, lying in wait,
X" MLA. Coin tit. 11. sec. 314 (1940)- ARIz. CoDE ANN. sec. 43.2902 (1939);
1 IRiK. STAl. ANN. sec. 41-2205 (1947): CALIF PENAL CoDE, tit. 8, sec. 189 (Deering,
1941); 2 CoLo. STAT. ANN., c. 48, sec. 32 (1935)- 2 CONN. REV. STAT., C. 323, sec, 6043
(1930); 1 Ir'AirO Co-ri ANN. sec. 17-1103 (1932); 2 IowA CODE sec. 690.2 (1946);
KN. GiN. STAT. ANN. sec. 21.401 (1935)- 1 MD. CODE ANN., art. 27 sec. 475 (Flack,
(1939): 6 MicH. Cop. LAWS sec. 1711-316 (Mason's Supp. 1943): 1 Mo. REV. STAT.
tcc. 4376 (1939); 5 MoxT. REV. CODE sec. 10955 (1935); 5 NEV. COMP. LAWS sec. 10068
(Hillyer, 1929): 1 N. J. REV. STAT. sec. 2:138-2 (1937)- 3 N. M. STAT. ANN. sec. 41-2404
(1941)- I N. C. Gr.N, STAT. sec. 14-17 (1943); 1 N. D. REV. CODE sec. 12-2712 (1943);
PA. STAT.. tit. 18, sec. 2221 (Prdon, 1936); R. I. GEN. LAws, c. 606, sec. I (1938)"
7 Ti-NN. Cons ANN. sec. 10768 (Williams, 1934); 5 UTAH CODE ANN. sec. 103-28-3
(1913); VT. PUB. LAws sec. 8374 (1933); VA. CODE ANN. sec. 4393 (1942); W VA.
CODL ANN. sec. 5916 (1943).
11 D. C. CooE sec. 22-2401 (1940)- NEB. REV. STAT. sec. 28-401 (1943); 2 N. H.
Ri v. LAWS, c. 455, sec. 1 (1942): 10 O1io GEN. CODE ANN. sec. 12400 (Page, 1939);
1 Wvo. CoMine. STAT., C. 9, sec. 9-201 (1945).
I-ARI. CODE ANN. sec. 43.2902 (1939); CALiF. PENAL CODE, tit. 8, sec. 189
(1)eering, 1941); 2 COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 48, sec. 32 (1935); 1 IDAHO CODF ANN. sec.
17-1103 (1932); 5 MONT. REV. CODE sec. 10955 (1935); 5 NEV. Come. LAws sec.
1006,8 (Hillver. 1929); 2 N. H. REv. LAws, c. 455, sec. 1 (1942); 3 N. M. STAT. ANN.
sec. 11.2401 (1941): 1 N. C. GEN. STAT. sec. 14-17 (1943); 1 N. D. REV. CODE sec.
12-2712 (1913).
"12 MAss. LAws A.., c. 265, sec. 1 (1932).
"12 N. H. REV. LAws, c. 455, sec. 1 (1942); 1 N. C. GEN. STAT. sec. 14-17 (1943);
W VA. Coor ANN. sec. 5916 (1943).
'NEB, RUV. STAT. sec. 28-401 (1943).
I N. C. GEN. STAT. sec. 14017 (1943); VA. CODE ANN. sec. 4393 (1942); W. VA.
Co.! AN.%, sec. 5916 (1943).
1'7 cnes v. People. 93 Colo. 282, 26 1 2d 103 (1933); Riley v. State, 9 Humph.
616 (Tenn. 1819).
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or torture shall be first degree murder if it is found to be intentional, deliberate
and premeditated. It is not impossible to imagine a murder intentionally com-
mitted by poison which is not deliberate and premeditated. In People v. Caruso"
the defendant murdered the doctor who was attending the son of the defendant.
The doctor had not provoked the defendant, but in the defendant's tortured mind
he imagined that the doctor laughed upon finding that the son was dead. It was
held that the killing was not premeditated. Suppose the defendant in this case,
instead of strangling and stabbing the doctor, had gone into the kitchen and re-
turned with a cup of poisoned coffee for the doctor from which the doctor drank
and died. Would this have shown deliberation and premeditation any more than
the acts of strangling and stabbing wich actually took place? It is believed that
the answer should not be in the affirmative as a matter of law. A murder by lying
in wait in which deliberation and premeditation did not exist is not impossible to
imagine. For example: A who has been reproved and incited to anger by B steps
out of the doorway of the room in which A and B had been present. Shortly
thereafter B comes through the doorway. It is dark and B does not realize that A
is waiting outside the doorway. A strikes B a blow which causes B's death. The
fact that A was lying in wait should be irrelevant if A was mentally incapable of
deliberation and premeditation. If only one injustice might occur from the prac-
tice of specially condemmng certain acts of killing, this should be sufficient to
discontinue the classification of particular manners of killing which are designed
to conclusively establish deliberation and premeditation. In Colorado a killing
perpetrated by torture is first degree murder, but a killing by extreme atrocity
and cruelty may not be." To base a decision upon the technical distinction be-
tween these two terms would seem to be a questionable procedure.
The manner in which the murder is effected should merely be evidence of
the intent and premeditation requisite for a first degree intentional murder con-
viction. It effects no real purpose to condemn specific acts in a murder statute
which conclusively establish deliberation and premeditation unless it is to ease
the burden of the prosecution. In fact, to specially condenm certain acts as
deliberate and intentional murder by statute shows an attempt to categorize
human minds collectively.
The Califorma type of intentional murder statutes have attempted to describe
the requisite state of mind for a first degree intentional murder conviction by list-
ing certain specially condemned acts as murder. But it was impossible and
impracticable, of course, for the legislators to list all the manners of killing which
might amount to first degree murder. Therefore, it was necessary to describe in
more general terms the state of mind which might be found to warrant a first
degree murder conviction. This general phrase in the California statute follows
immediately after the terms pozson, lying in wait, etc., and is phrased, " or by
any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing." The First degree
murder statutes of twenty-mine states and the District of Columbia, as does the
"1246 N. Y. 437 159 N. E. 390 (1927).
0"'rowntend v. People, 107 Colo. 258, 111 P 2d 236 (1941).
In People v. Thomas, 25 Cal. 2d 880, 156 P 2d 7 18 (1945), the court
stated, " the more general words 'or any other kind of wullful, deliberate and
premeditated killing, following the specifically enumerated instances of killing
which are expressly declared to constitute murder of the first degree, must be
construed in the light of such specifically listed types and be held to include only
killings of the same general kind or character as those specifically mentioned."
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Californa statute, require a deliberate and premeditated killing.*'- Others omit
the word deliberate and employ the term premeditated only.' The statutes of
Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana and Maine make no mention of deliberation
and premeditation. The statute of Delaware requires express malice afore-
tbought," and Georgia, Illinois and Maine require malice aforethought either
express or implied.' The Louisiana statute has no terminology descriptive of
deliberation and premeditation.'
This general phraseology, descriptive of the requisite state of mind for an
intentional first degree murder conviction, should indicate that a mere momentary
impulse to kill is not in accord with the legislative intent in the use of the words
deliberate and premeditated. '  Literally, deliberation and premeditation indicate
thought processes which require a lapse of a certain period of time. But an in-
terval of time is not all that the words connote. In addition to and dunng ths
period of time these words require, it would seem, that a rational mind be at
work before it can logically be said that there was deliberation and premeditation.'
-1A. CODE, tit. 14, sec. 314 (1940): ARIZ. Comi, A'N. sec. 43.2902 (1939); 4 ARK.
Si %l. Ax%. sec. 41-2205 (1947); 2 COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 48. sec. 32 (1935); 2 CoN,\. REv.
SiAr., c. 323, ,cc. 6043 (1930): 1 D. C. Cooi sec. 22-2401 (1940): 1 IDAHO Co-w Axx.
%et. 17-1103 (1932); 2 Iows CoDE sec. 690.2 (1946): KAN. C;F . STA-r. ANN. 'cc. 21.401
(1935): I MI. Coot Ax.. Art. 27. sec. 175 (Flack. 1939): 2 MAss. LAws ANN.. c. 265.
,c-(. I (1932): 6 licii. Co.\r,. LAWS sec. 17115-316 (Masons Supp. 1943); I Mo.
Rtv. ST,%i. ;ec. 1376 (1939): 5 ,MoNT. Rn'. CODI. sec. 10955 (1935): NEB. Rr v.
Si %I. ,cc. 28-401 (1943); NFv. Cosip. LAWS sec. 10068 (Hillyer, 1929); 2 N. H. Ruv.
lAws, c. 155, sec. I (1942): 1 N. J. RV. SIAr. sec. 2:138-2 (1937); 3 N. M. STA'r.
\Nx. sec. tl.2104 (1911): N. Y. Co NsoL. LIVws. Pt. 1, sec. 1044 (1) (Thompson, 1939):
I N. C. G(N. STT. sec. 14-17 (1943): 10 OHIO GEx. CODE ANN. Sec. 12400 (Page,
1939); 3 ORE. Co. %i,. LAws. sec. 23-4(01 (1940): PA. STAT., tlit. 18, sec. 2221 (Purdon,
1936): R. I. GLx. Lxiws. c. 606, sec. 1 (1938): 7 TENN. CODE ANN. sec. 10768 (Wil-
liais, 1934): 5 UTAH CoDE Axx,. -cc. 103-28-3 (1943): VT. PUB. LAWS sec. 8374 (1933):
V.%. CoOL ANN. sec. 4393 (1942); W VA. Cot, ANN. sec. 5916 (1943).
FLA. STiT. sec. 782.04 (1941): 4 IxD. STAT. sec. 103401 (Burns, 1933); 2 Mrxx.
Si %r. ,cc. 619.07 (1945); 1 N. D. Rrv. Com.o sec. 12-2712 (1943) (Deliberate or pre-
mcditated): 4 WASH. RE-'. STAT. tit. 4, sec. 2392 (1) (Remington, 1932); Wisc. STAr.
sec. 340.02 (1943): 1 W''o. COMP. STAT. sec. 9-291 (1945).
-IDrL. REV. CODE, c. 148, 5157 sec. 1 (1935) (Many of the states which ise the
uords dtliberate and premeditated use the term malice aforethought to define mur-
der generally. as does the California statute quoted in the text supra).
-"6 GAx. CODE ANN. 'cC. 60 (Parks, 1914); ILL. REV. STAT., c. 38, sec. 358 (1947):
ML. RLV. STAT., c. 129. sec. 1 (1930) (In these three states there are no degrees of
murder).
LA. CRIM. CODE sec. 740-30 (Dart, 1943) (No degree of murder in La.).
"''See People v. Thomas, 25 Cal. 2d 880, ., 156 P 2d 7 18 (1945).
"'The cotrts are not unanimous in their interpretation of the meanings of
deliberation and premeditation.
Premeditation refers to the time element; deliberation to the coolness of mind
or the purposeful character of the act. See, Commonwealth v. Brooks, 308 Mass.
:67. ., 32 N. E. 2d 242, 243 (1941); Torres v. State, 39 N. M. 191, ., 43 P 2d
929. 931 (1935); State v. Evans, 198 N. C. 82. ., 150 S. E. 678, 679-680 (1929).
But see State v. Wilmer, 97 Kan. 353, ., 155 Pac. 7 8 (1916).
There is no distinction between the words deliberation and premeditation.
White v. State, 236 Ala. 124, 181 So. 109 (1938); State v. Worley, 82 AV Va. 350,
96 S. E. 58 (1918). See MAY, CRIMINAL LAw 270 (2d ed. 1938).
Deliberate and premeditated do not mean the same thing as a mere intent.
.Se People v. Bender, 27 Cal. 2d 164, ., 163 P 2d 8, 18 (1945); State v. Bono-
figlio, 67 N. J. L. 239, ., 52 At. 712, 713 (1902).
Deliberate means "to weight in the mind; to consider the reasons for and
against: to consider maturely' reflect upon; ponder." Webster's New Intl' Dic
tionars 692 (2d ed. 1939). Premeditate means "to think on, and revolve in the
mind, beforehan4j; to contrive and design previously." Id. at 1950.
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Obviously the legislatures and the courts cannot categorically lay down a specific
period of time by which to measure and gauge deliberation and premeditation in
all cases. Neither would it seem that the legislatures and courts can set forth
any general objective tests to determine if there has been a rational mental process
during that period which transpires from the formation of intent to kill until thekilling actually occurs. Many courts hold that it is unnecessary that any penod
of time elapse between the fomenting of the intent to kill and the killing.' The
statutes of North Dakota, Oklahoma and South Dakota incorporate this rule.!"
Other courts using more cautious language state that there must be a lapse of
an appreciable time between the intent to kill and the killing in order to sustain
a first degree murder conviction.'
It is more realistic and probably the practice of most courts to abandon the
time element as an infallible test and merely inquire if there has been a rational
mental process. Under such plan, time is a factor, of course, but not necessarily
the controlling factor in arriving at a decision. The state of mind of the de-
fendant immediately preceding the killing up until the time of the act of killing
is the important factor. How to determne this state of mind is one of the most
important and one of the most important and one of the most difficult problems
in the criminal law. It is one of the most important because a verdict that there
was deliberation and premeditation may result in the extermination of a life which
might well be beneficial to society. It is one of the most difficult because the court
and jury must, if the job is properly done, pry into the subjective mental processes
of a human being, a task which science will unquestionably admit cannot be
done without error.
All courts and juries must use the objective circumstances of the killing as a
factor in determimng if deliberation and premeditation exist. It is necessary in
perhaps most cases to find deliberation and premeditation wholly from circum-
stantial evidence.' "Ill will, previous difficulty between the parties, declaration
of intent to kill either before or after striking the fatal blow" may be sufficient
evidence of deliberation and premeditation." If the killing was by the use of a
deadly weapon this may establish an inference of deliberation and premeditation.'
If the killing was committed in a brutal manner this is evidence of first degree
murder.' Of course these tests are valid and necessary but they are no more
than general evidentiary rules which can be applied to the case of each and every
individual to determine the existence or non-existence of deliberation and pre-
meditation. However, if deterrence of crime is to be realized as fully as possible,
intentional murder should be pumshed as first degree only where the defendant
' Sullivan v. State, 47 Ariz. 224, 55 P 2d 312 (1986); People v. Patuba, 9 Cal.
2d 537, 71 P 2d 270 (1937); State v. Zukanskas, 132 Conn. 450, 45 A. 2d 289 (1945);
Bradshaw v. Com., 174 Va. 391, 4 S. E. 2d 752 (1939).
- 1 N. D. Rrv. CODE sec. 12-2709 (1943); OKLv. STAT., tit. 21, sec. 703 (1941);
1 S. D. CODE sec. 13.2008 (1939) (In Oklahoma and South Dakota murder has not
been divided into degrees).
10 Bullock v. United States, 122 F. 2d 213 (App. D. C. 1941); State v. Merry, 136
Me. 243, 8 A. 2d 143, 146 (1939); People v. Guadagino, 233 N. Y. 344, 353, 135 N. E.
594, 597 (1922); State v. Arata, 56 Wash. 185, 105 Pac. 227 (1909).
=1 State v. Watson, 222 N. C. 672, 24 S. E. 2d 540 (1943).
3Id. at 54.
13State v. Hines, 223 Iowa 1241, 275 N. W 10 (1937); State v. Wilson, 172 Ore.
373, 142 P 2d 680, 681 (1943); State v. Ah Lee, 8 Ore. 214 (1880). But cf. People
v. Lazar, 271 N. Y. 27 2 N. E. 2d 32 (1936).
21 Evans v. JUnited States, 122 F. 2d 461 (C. C. A. 10th 1941).
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in fact does deliberate and premeditate,' and whether or not he does so, it is
believed, should be garnered, not only from the physical circumstances of the
killing but from that particular defendant's subjective mental processes in each
individual case, taking into consideration his mental and emotional make-up along
with the objective circumstances of the act.
The law has long recogmzed that a sudden unprovoked assault, adultery or
certain other acts of provocation will reduce what might otherwise be first degree
nmrder to the crime of voluntary manslaughter. '  Several courts have expressly
recognized certain lesser acts of provocations to deny the existence of deliberation
and premeditation and thereby mitigate the degree of murder from first to second.
But the provocation must be one which would have obscured the reasomng power
of an ordinary man under like circumstances and would have been sufficient to
have prevented a rational thought process.' A quarrel between the defendant
and the deceased would seem sufficient to create a state of mind in the defendant
which might prevent deliberation and premeditation.' The Missouri Court has
stated that "Opprobrious epithets, insulting gestures and the like" are sufficient
provocation to deny the existence of deliberation and premeditation.'
In one case it was stated there may not have been deliberation and premedi-
tation where the defendant after being rebuked by the man who had inveigled her
into unlawful cohabitation, vent away, secured a razor, and on her return slashed
the inveigler s throat, causing his death." But it was found to be first degree
murder where the defendant, husband of the deceased, strangled the deceased
after being informed by her that she had found another man and did not care
whether she left the defendant or not.'" In a late Califorma decision, People v.
Thomas," the defendant and the deceased, both defense plant workers, had been
living in adultery for a number of years. The defendant worked mghts and the
deceased worked days. On the mght of the murder the defendant came back
home instead of going on to his job. As he approached the house he overheard
the mother of the deceased, who was at that time living with them, tell the de-
ceased that she (the deceased) should not be "runmng out" on the defendant.
The ensuing conversation between the deceased and her mother convinced the
defendant of his previous suspicions of his mate s infidelity. Defendant then went
into the house, pushed deceased out the door, and threw her from the porch.
She ran down the street and the defendant followed, shot and killed her. The
California Supreme Court reversed a first degree conviction holding that the trial
court erred in its interpretation of the statutory meamng of deliberation and pre-
In Bullock v. United States, 122 F 2d 213, 214 (App. D. C. 1941) the court
stated: "Statutes like ours, wich distinguish deliberate and premeditated murder
from other murder, reflect a belief that one who meditates an intent to kill and
then deliberately executes it is more dangerous, more culpable or less capable of
reformation than one who kills on sudden impulse; or that the prospect of the
death penalty is more likely to deter men from deliberate than from impulsive
murder."
CLARK and MARSHALL, CRIMES sec. 257 (4th ed. 1940).
" Rivers v. State, 75 Fla. 401, 78 So. 343 (1918).
'State v. Starnes, 218 N. C. 539, 11 S. E. 2d 553 (1940).
"See State v. Eaton, 154 S. IV 2d 767, 769 (Mo. 1941). In State v. Jackson, 344
Mo. 1055, 130 S. W 2d 595 (1939), the defendant testified that as he walked toward
the house of the deceased (defendant's ex-mistress) he overheard the deceased say
to another man that "she could kill the black son-of-a-bitch" (he defendant). Held:
This, if true, was sufficient provocation to negative deliberation and premeditation.
4"People v. Barberi, 149 N. Y. 256, 43 N. E. 635 (1896). Accord, People v.
Zackowitz, 254 N. Y. 192, 172 N. E. 466 (1930); People v. Fiorentino, 197 N. Y. 560,
91 N. E. 195 (1910).
4 People v. Duggan, 61 Cal. App. 2d 379, 143 P 2d 88 (1943).
"'25 Cal. 2d 880, 156 P 2d 7 (1945).
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meditation; that these words meant more than a mere specific intent. The court
stated that the legislative intent when creating the statute was to give greater
acknowledgment to "differing degrees" of human frailty and that the defendant
may not in fact have deliberated and premeditated.
In most of the cases just commented upon, the courts have given emphasis
to human frailty; or stated in other words, in those cases the courts have attempted
to delve into the particular defendant's subjective mental processes in order to
determine if there was an actual deliberation and premeditation, but apparently
none of them recognize any provocation which would not incite the passions of a
reasonable man.
In one situation the law, it would seem, has gone beyond the reasonable man
standard in recognizing a "human frailty." This is where the intoxicated mind
is allowed as a defense to deliberation and premeditation. Intoxication is a
rather generally recogmzed factor for the court and jury to consider in determin-
ing the existence or non-existence of deliberation and premeditation." Whether
or not it is just to recognize voluntary drunkenness as a factor which will confuse
the reasoning facilities and thereby mitigate a first degree murder to a second
degree murder is not questioned, but if it is, by way of analogy, the law should not
be so reluctant to recognze hereditary and environmental defects in the individual
wich result in character traits not common to all persons. Of course, every
alleged uncontrollable temper cannot be recognized by the law, but allowance, it
would seem, can be made where the particular circumstances justify it. It is be-
ieved thzt it is not unjust for a court to apply different standards to different
individuals in determining if there has been deliberation and premeditation, if the
court can practicably do so. It takes greater provocation to incite A than it does
to incite B, yet both commit murders under the same provocation, there is no
reason why B should not receive a milder punishment than A if B can convince
the court and jury by competent proof that he was incapable of deliberation and
premeditation at the time of the killing.
The only case found which recognizes a provocation which, it is believed,
would not have been a provocation to a reasonable man under like circumstances
and which was allowed to reduce what might have otherwise been first degree
murder to second degree murder is the case of People v. Caruso." In that case
the defendant Caruso murdered the doctor who was attending his son. The doctor
arrived late, not unlike doctors often do. Perhaps Caruso while awaiting the ar-
rival of the doctor meditated upon his poverty, his inability to furnish hIs son
better medical care, or perhaps better food. When the doctor arrived the son
was dead. Possibly Caruso had an ungovernable temper. That inference is not
unwarranted by the facts. Revenge for the death of his son no doubt entered
Caruso s mind. He did suspect malpractice, but had no reason to do so. But it
was held that Caruso did not kill with deliberation and premeditation. The life
of a blameless human being was extinguished, but who would have benefitted had
the life of his murderer also been extinguished?
Because of the peculiar circumstances in the Caruso case it is extremely easy
to agree that the defendant should not have been convicted of first degree murder.
Sympathy is invoked for him. But changing from that case to a situation where
there is no sympathy for the defendant, it is difficult for us to answer impartially
13Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835 (1891). See also cases cited in Notes,
12 A. L. R. 883-888 (1921) and 79 A. L. R. 903-904 (1932). But intoxication will
not be allowed to reduce the degree of murder if it can be showin that defendant
planned the murder before becoming intoxicated. State v. McManus, 217 N. C.
445, 8 S. E. 2d 251 (1940).
11 See note 19 supra.
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the question: Did the defendant actually deliberate and premeditate? Instead
most people are apt to look with sympathy toward the deceased and those he left
behind, and to look with anger and contempt upon the defendant.
Perhaps the solution to the problem of deliberation and premeditation rests
upon calm and deliberate-minded trial judges who are capable of creating a
judicial state of mind in the jury. If the jury looks upon the question of delibera-
tion and premeditation as the trial judge should look upon it, this will probably
be as near as the law can go toward achieving perfection as to the question of
deliberation and premeditation. The legislatures cannot lay down categorical
rules to guide the courts in determining the existence of deliberation and premedi-
tation. It would seem to be a matter in which the courts must necessarily have
great flexibility. The legislatures can and should require that deliberation and
premeditation exist for a first degree murder conviction.
The distinction between deliberation and premeditation stated by many of
the courts is perhaps more artificial than real, but making such distinction may
aid in informing the jury that a rational mental process is required for a first de-
gree murder conviction. There would seem to be no doubt that both words are
useful, and if an additional adjective description of a rational mental process
might be found its use would not create redundancy. There should be no doubt
that deliberation and premeditation mean more than a mere intent to kill at the
moment the killing takes place. Any person who kills, takes a life intentionally,
unless the act is accidental or negligent, but all do not kill with deliberation and
premeditation.
If deliberation and premeditation are to be the test for unexcusable and
unjustifiable homicides, which are designated as first degree murder, then what
is the role of malice aforethought in the first degree murder? Also, if a second
degree murder is a killing, not excusable or justifiable, which is not marked by
deliberation and premeditation, does the term malice aforethought have any sig-
nificance in this grade of homicide?
The significance and usefulness of malice aforethought, and certain further
problems, as related to the above questions, are discussed below.
Malice Aforethought
At the beginning of this note where a classification of intentional murder
statutes was attempted it was stated that one group (of which the Califorma
statute was an example) followed the common law definition of murder except
for the additional requisite of deliberation and premeditation; that another group
(of which the Georgia statute was typical) was merely declaratory of the common
law; and that still another group (of which the New York statute was illustrative)
attempted to depart from the common law definition of the crime.
The common law definition, of murder, which was the ualawful killing of a
human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied, is still in use
by the great majority of states today. Both the Georgia and Califorma type stat-
utes employ the common law term, malice aforethought. The reason or reasons
why the majority of states have tenaciously clung to the phrase is not to easily
understood. Is it because the phrase has some practical value to the law? How
have the states which have dispensed with the phrase accomplished such a result?
Malice aforethought, as analyzed by Stephens, was a phrase which signified
several states of mind. Brieflv these states of mind were: 5 (a) an intention to
cause death or grievous bodily harm to a human being; (b) knowledge that the
4
'STEPtENS, DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, 218-220 (8th ed. 1947).
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•ct in question which causes death will probably cause death or grievous bodily
hrm to a human being; (c) intent to commit a felony; and (d) an intention to
oppose the legal act or acts of an officer of the law where the offender has
knowledge of the officers identity.
In discussing the intentional murder we are, of course, only concerned with
(a) of Stephens analysis, but to get a clear concept of the term malice afore-
thought it is necessary to consider all of the classifications of the analysis col-
lectively. It is obvious that the four categorizations of the analysis cannot be
labelled either intentional or negligent alone since (a) itself is the actual inten-
tional state of mind found in the crime of murder and (b) is the negligent state
which accompanies the killing and which is now known to the law as the negligent
murder. A killing occurring under (c) or (d) of the analysis might be intentional
or negligent depending upon the circumstances of the particular case. These states
of mind collectively make up the term malice aforethought.
It is not seriously doubted that there was logie underlying the employment
of the term malice aforethought in the common law. It is difficult in most situa-
tions and impossible, perhaps, in others to determine whether the state of mind
which motivated a defendant to cause death was one of actual intent or, on the
other hand, one of wanton disregard of safety. There is a difference between
such states of mind, but to distinguish between them by proof is difficult." With
reference to criminal intent it has been said that "As far as actual intention is
concerned, more is required than an expectation that the consequence is likely to
result from the act."4'  But, "On the other hand it is not necessary that the conse-
quence should be 'desired' in the usual sense of that word '"4 Since a negli-
gent state of mind which will warrant a murder conviction is not too dissimilar in
physical make-up from an intentional state of mind which will also sustain a mur-
der conviction, it is not illogical that early in our judicial history there was felt
a need for ascribing to these states of mind a fixed general term, perhaps in order
to assign to such states an appropriate place in the law. This may be one reason
behind the early widespread employment of the term malice aforethought.
The utility of the phrase, however, has been questioned considerably," ' and
since deliberation and premeditation have found their way into the statutes, the
term would seem to be absolutely useless today in the intentional first degree mur-
der. Several states have phrased their statutes so as to leave out entirely any
mention of malice aforethought, yet the substantive crime of murder has not
basically changed from what it was at the common law, as that law was adopted
in this country. The statutes of Florida, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, New
York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin make
no mention of malice aforethought. The way in which these states have aban-
doned the use of the phrase is most simple. Instead of using malice aforethought
in the statutes, they have merely defined the phrase either by statute or by judicial
decision. In Minnesota, New York, and Washington, the statutes state that any
killing of a human being unless excusable or justifiable, is first degree murder
when committed with a premeditated design and that such killings are second
41 1 BisHoP, CRIMINAL LAW, sec. 313 (9th ed. 1923): "There is little distinction
except in degree between a will to do a wrongful thing and an indifference whether
it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies
the place of affirmative criminal intent."
47 Perkins, Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARV. L. REv. 905, 911 (1939).
48 Ibzd.
49 See Note, 38 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1054-1070 (1912).
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degree murder when committed with a design but without premeditation.' This,
as to the intentional murder, is essentially what malice aforethought in the legal
sense has long meant. The New York and Washington statutes in express terms
also state what murders are excusable and justifiable.' In Oklahoma, North Da-
kota, and South Dakota the statutes are to the effect that a killing without author-
ity of law shall be murder where the actor with a premeditated (or deliberate)
design effects the death of another.5
2 The statutes of these states, in order to de-
fine ,what is a killing without authority of law, define excusable and justifiable
homicides.' The remaimng states which have abolished the term malice afore-
thought, Flonda, Louisiana, New Jersey, and Wisconsin have also accomplished
such a result in a similar manner.' The Mississippi statute is worded very simil-
arly to the statutes just discussed and makes no mention of malice aforethought.'
However, in Bangren v. State, a case decided two years after the enactment of
the present Mississippi statute, the court stated that malice aforethought was a
necessary element of murder. Such a holding would appear to be contrary to
the legislative intent.
As early as 1854, the state of New York discarded the term malice afore-
thought from its law.; In 1919, the Florida Court held that the statute of that
state did not make malice an element of the offense of murder.' In the same
year the Newv Jersey Court in State v. Moynihan stated:
"It is not true, as counsel argue in their brief, that the
court eliminated from the jury the question of malice. This is an
unwarranted deduction made by counsel, because the court did not
in terms speak of malice being an ingredient of the crime charged.
Malice, in its legal sense, means nothing more than an evil state of
mind. The premeditated and deliberate design of a sane man to
kill a human being, purposely executed without adequate legal ]usti-
fication, stamps such an act as the result of an evil state of mind;
hence an act conceived in malice "5'
It has been held in a jurisdiction which employed the term malice aforethought
that it was not error for the trial court to omit any reference to the term in an
instruction to a jury.'
-2 MIx. SIAr., ses. 619-07. 619.08 (1945)- N. Y Co,.sot.. LAWS, pt. 1, secs.
10-I1. 1046 (Thompson. 1939); 1 WAsn. Rrv. STAI.. tit. I-1, secs. 2392, 2393 (Reining.
ton, 1932).
-1 N. Y CoNsoi., L\ws. pt. 1, secs. 1054, 1055 (Thompson, 1939); -4 WxLsii. REV.
SAr., tit. 14, sees. 2404-2406 (Remington, 1932).
:'OKI.A. STAL.. lit. 21. sec. 701 (1941): 1 N. D. Ri--%,. ConE, sec. 12-2708 (1943);
1 S. 1). Coi ec. 13.2007 (1939) (Among these states, none except North Dakota
have div ided murder into degrees).
-'OKI.%. Si Lr., tit. 21, secs. 731-733 (1941); 1 N. D. Ri.'. CODE, secs. 12-2703-
12-2705 (1943); 1 S. D. ConE, secs. 13-2002-13.2004 (1939).
"" FLA. SIAT., secs. 782.02-782.04 (1941); LA. CRIMINAL CODE, sec. 740-30
()art, 1943)- 1 N.J. REV. SrA2., secs. 2:138-2, 2:138-6 (1937): Wise. STAT. secs. 340.02,
3-10.29. 340.30 (1943). (The Louisiana Code does not define excusable and justi-
liable homicides).
-12 Miss. Corn ANN., tit. 11, secs. 2215, 2218, 2219 (1942).
A 196 Miss. 887, 17 So. 2d 599 (1944).
D, l)arr) v. People, 10 N. Y. 120, 136, 137 (1854).
'Riggins v. State, 78 Fla. 459, 83 So. 267 (1919).
-93 N. J. Law, 253, 106 AtI. 817 819 (1919).
1Pruitt v. State, 163 Miss. 47, 139 So. 861 (1932), Durham v. State, 158 Miss.
833, 131 So. -112 (1930).
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It is not contended that the states whose statutes have abolished the term
malice aforethought have eliminated the substantive meaning of that term, as it
was used in the late common law, from their law. They have merely eliminated
the term istelf. If murder is the killing of a human being which does not come
within the definition of manslaughter and which is not excusable nor justifiable,
and malice aforethought is the state of mind which motivates such a killing, malice
aforethought in substantive meaning will perhaps always remain in the law of
murder. If this is true, is it greatly important that use of the term should be. dis-
continued?
The most practical reason that can be advanced as to why it would be best
to dispense with the phrase is that its use is apt to confuse the jury. But this
single reason is obviously sufficient to warrant discarding it.
The legal significance of malice has already been explained. This legal mean-
ing of the term is almost the very antithesis of the ordinary meaning of the word.
To the layman, malice means hatred, spite, malevolence, but malice as used in
murder " is not limited to hatred, ill will, or malevolence, but denotes a
wicked and corrupt disregard of the lives and safety of others "8
On the other hand, what is to be said in favor of retaining the term malice
aforethought in the law? Professor Perkins has stated the argument as follows:
With its [malice aforethought's] present import, it
is rather a bit of juridical shorthand than an explanatory expression.
It is not a key which unlocks mysteries, but a label to be attached
after the secret is solved. It has no magical powers. It is not a
rule of thumb which can dispense with a rigid scrutiny of the facts
of each particular case. It is, however, a convement symbol. The
psychical element of the crime of murder is so complex and compli-
cated that legal discussions would be greatly handicapped if there
were no term to express it. If no more than this is demanded of
the phrase malice aforethought', it has a very important function
to form.".
2
Such argumaent is not even remotely convincing. It is true that retention of the
phrase would not be unsound if it could'be limited to use in classroom or private
discussion, or to judicial and legal writing. But this is impossible of accomplish-
ment. If the phrase is retained for any purpose in the law it will be used in
courtroom instructions to juries. For this reason, it is believed that the use of
malice aforethought should be discarded.
Express and Implied Malice.
In those states in which the term malice aforethought is still of significance,
the word malice or malice aforethought has been broken down into malice express
and malice implied. The Califorma statute in defining malice states:
"Such malice may be express or implied. It is express
when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take
away the life of a fellow-creature. It is implied, when no considerable
provocation appears "6
"Noble v. State, 95 Ark. 453, 112 S. AV 2d 631, 633 (1938).
12 Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L. J. 537,
570 (1933).
' CALM. PENAL CODE, tit. 8, sec. 188 (Deering, 1941).
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Express Malice.
The definition of express malice as set forth by the California statute would
appear to be the same as that expressed at an earlier date by Blackstone. Such
definition was as follows:
"Express malice is when one, with a sedate deliberate
mind and formed design, doth kill another: which formed design is
evidenced by external circumstances discovenng that inward inten-
tion; as lying in wait, antecedent menaces, former grudges, and con-
certed schemes to do him some bodily harm.'""
Express malice as used above refers to the character of proof by wluch a murderous
state of mind is discovered. The term through its long history has acquired
other meanings to such an extent that it would seem of dubious value even if the
term malice aforethought is retained. It has acquired at least three other mean-
ings. First, the term has acquired the meaning of ill will, hate and malevolence,
and second, it has come to be known in modern statutes as the legal equivalent of
the term "deliberation and premeditation."
' Thus killings which result from
poison, lying in wait, torture, prejury or subornation of perjury or extreme atrocity
and cruelty would be denominated as killings with express malice. Such manners
of killing are the one pointed out heretofore as being those which many statutes
make conclusive evidence of deliberation and premeditation, and hence first degree
murder in the states which have divided murder into degrees. Such a definition of
express malice is no doubt what leads some courts to state that a killing by express
malice is first degree murder. The following third and extremely umque use of
the term appears in some cases: If A with legal malice toward B, kills B, he is
said to have acted with express malice. While on the other hand, if A with legal
malice toward B kills C instead of B, A is said to have acted with tmplied malice.'
If the tern malice aforethought were abolished from the law by one swift stroke
of the legislative pen it would be unnecessary to advocate the discontinuance of
the supposedly descnptive adjectives express and implied. But if it can be urged
upon the legislatures that the use of the terms express malice and implied malice
are in hopeless confusion, this may prompt hastier consideration of the undesir-
ability, of the term malice aforethought. In an early New York case, Darry v.
People, it was stated:
There is no difference in the nature or degree of
the malice intended, whether it be called express or implied, when
these terms are used in their most appropriate sense. If properly
applied, they refer only to the evidence by which the exstence of
malice is established. Both alike, the one no less than the other,
mean actual malice, malice shown by the proof to have really ex-
isted. They are appropriate terms to express different modes of
proof, and are habitually used for that purpose, but are not adapted
to the description of different degrees of malicious intent. "6
Again in the same opinion Judge Selden said:
"A glance at the law of murder, as it existed prior to the
Revised Statutes, will make it evident that the terms express and im-
plied malice used so copiously in every definition of murder
at common law, must have been intentionally excluded from the stat-
BL. COMM. 199.
See Note, 38 L. R. A. (-x. s.) 1054, 1073 (1912).
"See State v. Phillips, 187 Ad. 108, 110 (Del. ct. Oyer & Ter., 1936).
Ferrell v. State, 43 Tex. 503 (1875).
10 N. Y. 120, 136, 137 (1854).
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ute; and I think it equally clear, in view of the great looseness and
inaccuracy with which these terms had been used, that this exclusion
was wise."'
Implied Malice.
Implied malice, just as express malice, may refer to the method of proof."
Where the malice is not expressly apparent it may be implied, i.e., inferred as a
fact or presumed as a matter of law. Used in that sense, implied malice is a
term which covers that part of the field which is not covered by express malice.
For example, those states which hold that a killing by express malice is first degree
murder may arbitrarily hold that those prompted by implied malice are second
degree."' The term has also been used to signify a killing in which the offender
intending to kill A instead kills B." The theory of implied malice, as to the inten-
tional murder perhaps can best be illustrated by discussing certain doctrines which
have developed in the law of murder. These are: (1) the presumption of malice
which arises from the act of killing, and (2) the presumption of malice which
follows the use of a deadly weapon.
Presumption of malice from the act of killing.
It is not often, of course, that a killing occurs where the only evidence avail-
able is the fact that a defendant has committed the act, but such cases do arise.
There are also many cases which arise where there is but little evidence other than
that defendant has killed another. Statutes in several states have provided for
such occurrences by placing an evidential burden on the defendant." The Ar-
kansas statute may be said to be typical of such legislation. The Arkansas statute
is phrased as follows:
"Burden of proof-The killing being proved, the burden of
proving circumstances of mitigation, that justify or excuse the homi-
cide, shall devolve on the accused, unless by the proof on the part of
the prosecution it is sufficiently manifest, that the offense committed
only amounted to manslaughter, or that the accused was justified or
excused in committing the homicide. " 74
In an early Massachusetts case, the lower court instructed to the effect that
where the state had established the killing it was upon the defendant to prove by
a preponderance of evidence that he did not commit the act or that his actions
were justified or that there were extenuating circumstances. There were other
instructions which lessened the harshness of that instruction, but as a whole the
instructions were clearly prejudicial. The appeal court, however, did not reverse.'
In another early case, the jury, in the lower court was instructed that every homi-
cide is presumed to be murder in the second degree and in order to elevate the
offense to murder in the first degree, the burden of proof was on the state, and in
order to reduce the offense below murder in the second degree, the burden of
,9 Id. at 136.
'o See Note 64, supra.
People v. Butterfield, 40 Calif. App. 2d 725, 105 Pac. 2d 628 (1940); See also
State v. Phillips, 187 At. 108, 110 (Del. ct. Oyer & Ter., 1936).
7-Musick v. State, 21 Tex. App. 69, 18 S. AV. 95 (1886).
14 ARK. SrAT. ANN., sec. 41-2246 (1947); CALIF. PENAL CODE, tit. 7, sec. 1105
(Deering, 1941); 2 CoLo. STAT. ANN., c. 48, sec. 50 (1935); ILL. RE-.. STATS., c. 38, sec.
373 (1947); 5 Nav. Cozup. LAWS, sec. 10972 (Hillyer, 1929); OKLA. SrAT., tit. 21, sec.
702 (1941); 1 S. D. CODE, sec. 13.2008 (1939).
11 4 ARK. STAT. ANN., sec. 41-2246 (1947).
" Com. v. York, 9 Met. 93, 43 Am. Dec. 373 (1845).
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proof was on the defendant. On appeal it was held this instruction was not
prejudicial inasmuch as the jury was told in other instructions that they should
consider all of the evidence presented.' Technically such an instruction was
clearly erroneous and mght, as a practical matter, have been prejudicial since it
is undisputed that in a cnminal case the burden of proof rests throughout the trial
on the prosecution.
While there are courts which take a rather strict view of the so-called presump-
tion of malice from the act of killing doctrine, there are others which have taken
an extremely liberal view. In a late Virginia case, Roark v. Commonwealth,- the
defendant, during a quarrel with deceased, struck lum a not-too violent blow,
which knocked him to the street causing a brain concussion and death. The upper
court held that the presumption of malice instruction should not have been given;
that the facts did not warrant such an instruction. In Miller v. State,' an Indiana
ease, the defendant was a war veteran who in active service had been gassed and
shelled. He had never fully recovered from his war experiences. The evidence
was to the effect that he and his companion consumed several alcoholic drinks at
a tavern and that after returmng home defendant shot his companion. The de-
fense was that the killing was accidental, that the gun went off as defendant
examined same to determine the name of the maker.' There was no evidence of
enmity between the parties; there was also no evidence of struggle in the room
where the killing took place. The court of appeal, in reversing the lower court,
stated: "The 'law never presumes murder upon any state of facts. 'It is the in-
elusive province of the jury, to indulge in a presumption of guilt' " Such a
holding could be called a direct repudiation of the presumption of malice from
the act of killing theory, yet it may be that the decision is in effect not so broad.
In England the doctrine of presumption of malice from the act of killing has
been expressly repudiated in the case of Woolmngton v. Dir. of Public Prosecu-
tionls.' just what effect its abolition will have on English law is not too easy to
predict. It is no doubt true that if there are no presumptions of law attached to
the unexplained killing this would mean that there will be no instructions given
to the effect that the burden of showing excuse, justification or palliating circum-
stances rests upon the defendant. Also, it would mean that an appellate court
could not supply, by presumption of law, the, omission, in an instruction in the
trial court, of an essential element of the crime charged. There should be no
legal presumptions in the crime of murder. The jury will without the aid of a
presumption in the form of an instruction, draw the proper inferences from the
fact that defendant has killed another and has offered no evidence to excuse,
justify or palliate the act. It, must be conceded that a jury cannot be demed the
right to decide questions of fact in criminal cases, but very often an erroneous
instruction will prejudice a jury toward a defendant. There are limitations on
'State v. Bailey, 103 W. Va. 605, 138 S. E. 202 (1927).
, 182 Va. 244, 28 S. E. 2d 693 (1944). In State v. Cross, 212 V Va. 25$, 24 S. E.
06 (1896), the court held that the presumption of malice instruction was only
proper in a case where the killing appeared to have been willful and intentional.
"223 Ind. 50, 158 N. E. 2d 114 (1944).
' n Davis v. State, 51 Neb. 301, 70 N. IV. 984 (1897), the court stated that the
prestimption was not rebutted where the defendant testified that his purpose in
tampering with a railroad track, which caused the derailment of a train, was that
he intended to flag the train and to pretend to have discovered the condition of
the track in the hope of obtaining a reward.
In Baker v. People, 114 Colo. 50, 160 Pac. 2d 983 (1945), the Colorado Court
held that where the killing has been established the court should instruct upon the
defense no matter how incredible, improbable, or unreasonable the testimony of the
defendant mnay be.
' 1935 A. C. 460.
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the legislative power to disturb the discretion of the court to properly comment
on the evidence,"t it is true, but it is within the legislative province to enact laws
which will prevent peremptory instructions in capital cases where the only evi-
dence is that defendant has committed an unexplained homicide.
Presumption of Malice from the Use of a Deadly Weapon.
It is stated to be the rule that the law implies or infers malice from the use
of a deadly weapon.' The basis of this doctrine, no doubt, originated out of pure
common sense and human experience. It is no more than would be expected for
a jury to infer that if A has killed B with a deadly weapon, A, unless he offers
sufficient proof in rebuttal, acted with a design to kill B. Likewise, if A adrms-
ters poison to B, or shoots him from ambush, or tortures B, or has a strong motive
for killing B, it is only reasonable to infer that A acted with a design to kill B. In
such situations it is a natural probability that A intended to kill, because he used
a deadly weapon and should be held accountable for knowing that such weapon
would cause death or serious bodily harm.
A deadly weapon is one which is likely to cause death or senous bodily harmn '
Such definition takes into consideration the nature of the weapon and the manner
in which it is used.' It would seem that the type of the weapon means little
unless considered with the manner of its use.' There must be a weapon, but
that may be any instrument or other thing which can be used to destroy human
life. The basic consideration is whether or not the object was used in such a way
as might cause death or serious bodily harm. If the weapon was so used, should
this be a mere fact for the jury to consider in arriving at a verdict, or should the
law create presumptions which may carry greater weight toward a conviction
than mere inferences of fact? The statute of Texas may in certain situations
create true presumptions of law where there has been a killing with a deadly
weapon. The Texas statute is as follows:
"Intention presumed.-The intent to commit an offense is
presumed wheneved the means used is such as would ordinarily re-
sult in the commission of the forbidden act.""
In a recent Texas case, Baylor v. State, the defendant killed the deceased
by stabbing him in the neck with a pocket knife. Upon the trial for murder the
lower court instructed the jury to the effect that if the defendant voluntarily and
with malice aforethought killed the deceased, he should be found guilty of murder.
The jury was also instructed that: " A deadly weapon is one which, from the
manner used, is calculated or likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.""'
On appeal, it was determined, by some process of reasoning, that the trial court
in the instruction did not require the jury to find, in order to convict, that de-
fendant had the intent to kill; that the statute created the presumption only in
"'See People v. McMurchy, 249 Mich. 1471, 228 N. W 723, 726 (1930).
uPitts v. State, 216 Ind. 168, 23 N. E. 2d 673 (1939); 2 BISHOP CRiMINAL LAW,
sec. 680 (9th ed. 1928).
1Harris v. State, 75 Ga. App. 199, 43 S. E. 2d 110 (1947).
People v. Russell, 59 Calif. App. 2d 660. 139 Pac. 2d 661, 663 (1943).
-See Pannill v. Com., 185 Va. 244, ., 38 S. E. 2d 457 (1946).
'TEXAS PENAL CODE, Art. 45 (Vernon, 1936). The deadly weapon statute in
Alabama is as follows: " When the killing in any sudden encounter or affray
is caused by the assailant by the use of a deadly weapon, which was concealed
before the commencement of the fight, his adversary having no deadly weapon
drawn, such killing' is murder in the second degree, and may, according to the
circumstances, be murder in the first degree." See ALA. CODE, tit. 14, sec. 316 (1940).
67208 S. W 2d 558 (Texas, 1948).
8Id. at 560.
81Id. at 560. (The charge to the jury included both the phrase malice afore-
thought and the word voluntarily).
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cases where the weapon was deadly per se; and that since a pocket knife was not
a deadly weapon per se it was error for the trial court not to require the jury to
find an intent to kill. But the court in its opinion stated:
"The intent presumped by Art. 45, P c., [the statute set
out above] is a legal presumption against the accused and should be
strictly construed, because it is at variance with and antagomstic to
the paramount presumption of innocence which continues throughout
the trial of every criminal case. The intent to kill which is
presumed in a murder case arises only when the weapon 'used
is such as would ordinarily result in the commssion of that crime.
This has reference to the weapon, itself. We cannot bring our-
selves, therefore, to the conclusion that a weapon deadly only because
of the manner of its use and not deadly of and within itself is not
[sic] within the presumption. " *
The implication of Baylor v. State is that if the defendant causes a death with
any instrument which is per se deadly, that although an instruction omits to men-
tion that the jury must find the killing intentional, such is not error, for the law
will presume the necessary intent. Such a view, it is submitted, will work in-
justice, It may, in a case in which the court determines that the weapon was
deIdlv per se, take the real question of fact out of the hands of the jury and place
it in the control of the court. Proof of the use of a deadly weapon must, of course,
have its proper effect in a given case but proof of the, use of a deadly weapon
should not deny a defendant the right to have all the essential elements of the
crime charged submitted to the jury.
The deadly weapon doctrine, it would seem is presently employed to serve
two related purposes in the law of murder. First, where the assault is admittedly
intentional or where the evidence is unequivocal that it was intentional, the doc-
trine serves only to gauge the degree of harm intended. Second, if the only evi-
dence is the proof of a homicide by the use of a deadly weapon, i.e., if there is
no proof of an intentional assault, the law may presume that the offender acted
with an intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. In the latter situation it is
not intent which invokes the doctrine; but instead it is the doctrine which revokes
the intent.
In the deadly weapon doctrine as in the presumption of malice from the act
of killing, justice would not go wanting if there were no legal presumptions which
in any way might place the burden of proof on the defendant. The jury will,
without the aid of such presumptions, draw the proper inferences from the fact
that defendant has killed and has offered no evidence to excuse, justify or palliate
the act.
Presumption from the use of a deadly weapon and presumption of unexplained
killing compared.
The presumption of malice from the act of killing doctrine in practical effect
includes the deadly weapon doctrine. It is generally held that under either doc-
tnne if the defendant offers no evidence in excuse, justification, or palliation that
the cnme is second degree murder; that it is upon the state to prove the crime
was first degree murder and upon the defendant to show the crime was man-
slaughter or that it was no crime at all." So far as can be told from the cases the
presumption which accompanies each doctrine is of the same strength. There is
one difference between the doctrines and this difference makes the presumption
from the act of killing the more undesirable. This difference is that in the pre-
Id. at 561.
Wagner v. State, 37 S. W 2d 86 (Ark.. 1931); Coin. v. Troup, 302 Pa. 246,
153 At. 337 (1931).
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sumption of malice from the act of killing, the weapon which caused the death
need not be a deadly one; therefore, such doctrine is a more potent weapon against
those accused of the crime of murder.
Conclusmon.
When the intentional murder statute of the various states are considered as a
whole the question arises as to what the legislatures might do to clarify and im-
prove the law of murder. The California and New York type statutes have gen-
erally adopted the requirement of deliberation and premeditation for a first
degree murder conviction. While all of these states have not placed upon the
words deliberation and premeditation a meaning other than a mere intent to take
life, some of them do require a lapse of an appreciable period of time in order for
it to be found that deliberation and premeditation existed. The statutes of a
minority of states, for example, the Georgia type statute, do not make deliberation
and premeditation a requirement of murder. Deliberation and premeditation, it
is believed, should be made a requirement of first degree murder and in order
that punishment be most effective as a deterring force, only those who actually
do deliberate and premeditate should be punished for first degree murder.
Whether or not there was deliberation and premeditation in a particular case
should be a question of fact for the jury and the jury should upon the advice of
the court give acknowledgement to human frailties in arriving at a decision. To
state that particular manners of killing are conclusive evidence of deliberation
and premeditation, as the Califorma type statute does, is undesirable.
The modern murder statutes have not greatly altered the common law of
murder as is set forth in Stephen s analysis. The similarity of Stephen's analysis
and the statutes may be readily seen by a cursory comparison. At least ten states,
however, have discarged the word malice in the crune of murder. The phrases
malice -aforethought and express and implied malice have not a single practical
advantage to offer toward a clarification of murder, and, on the other hand, no
doubt, at times confuse the juries wich must consider such phraseology. If it is
found that legal terminology, after a careful weighing of advantages and dis-
advantages, is of no value to the law, it should be discarded. The legislatures, if
they wish to abolish the term malice from the law, may do so by revising their
murder statutes so as to omit any reference to that term. There is also no reason
why the courts in the various states where malice aforethought is used in the
definition of murder could not dispense with the necessity of the use of the phrase,
without statutory change, by judicial decision as long as the substantive meaning
of the term is retained.
It is not contended that the statutes of all of the states could be improved,
but it is true that the majority could be. The New York statute, for example,
would seem as near perfect as is possible to phrase a murder statute. Other states
have statutes very similar to the New York statute. There is found in the New
York Statutes or decisions no mention of legal presumptions arising from an un-
explained killing or from the use of a deadly weapon. A few may escape de-
served punishment if legal presumptions in murder are abolished, but this would
seem to be outweighed by the fact that if such presumptions are entertained a few
who are innocent will be unjustly punished.
It is not that the substantive law of murder needs a thorough revision, for
perhaps that law as it presently exists, in great part, represents the feelings and
beliefs of the people more so than any other branch of the law. The real objection
to the present state of the law of murder would seem to be in the obsolete
theories and phraseology earned over from the common law. Broad abstract
terms should be cautiously employed in the law of murder for while they may
have been useful for clarifying thought at one time, many of them have grown
into devices for confusing thought.
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